Protest 160118100231; U.S. International Trade Commission; Limited Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-1016, Certain Access Control Systems and Components Thereof

HQ H300129 September 7, 2018 OT:RR:BSTC:IPR H300129 JW/CBC/CAB CATEGORY: 19 U.S.C. § 1337; Unfair Competition VIA EMAIL: Armando.Taboada@cbp.dhs.gov; Richard.A.Dontzig@cbp.dhs.gov; Miguel.Plaza@cbp.dhs.gov Mr. Armando Taboada Director of Machinery Center of Excellence & Expertise U.S. Customs and Border Protection 109 Shiloh Dr., Ste 300 Laredo, TX 78045 ATTN: Mr. Richard Dontzig (Supervisory Import Specialist) Mr. Miguel Plaza (Senior Import Specialist) RE: Protest 160118100231; U.S. International Trade Commission; Limited Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-1016, Certain Access Control Systems and Components Thereof Dear Mr. Taboada: This letter is in response to protest number 160118100231 filed by One World Technologies, Inc. (“Protestant” or “One World”) challenging the denial of entry of Entry No. [[ ]], which included 936 units of Ryobi GD126 garage door openers (the “merchandise at issue”). See e.g., Exh. G of Protest; CBP Form 19. We find that the merchandise at issue is subject to the limited exclusion order issued by the International Trade Commission (“Commission” or “ITC”) in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016 pursuant to section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Accordingly, this protest challenging an exclusion from entry is DENIED. We note that Protestant filed a petition for a modification proceeding at the Commission regarding the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers (i.e., the same products as the merchandise at issue). See One World’s Memorandum in Support of Protest at 4; Commission Order (Modification Proceeding) Dated September 4, 2018. In an order dated September 4, 2018, the Commission determined to institute this modification proceeding. Commission Order (Modification Proceeding) Dated September 4, 2018 at 3. The Commission has ordered the Administrative Law Judge designated to preside over this modification proceeding to issue a recommended determination within six months after publication of notice of this Commission Order in the Federal Register. Id. Protestant One World Technologies, Inc. was named as one of the parties to the modification proceeding. Id. Commission determinations under section 337, including all conclusions of law and findings of fact (such as a particular construction of a claim limitation and the corresponding comparison of that construction with features of the products found to infringe) are binding on U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and will be applied by CBP with preclusive effect against products of a respondent identified in a limited exclusion order. In the event a later-issued Commission determination includes conclusions of law or findings of fact that conflict with a prior-issued ruling by CBP under 19 C.F.R. part 177 or a prior-issued protest review decision by CBP under 19 C.F.R. part 174, the later-issued Commission determination will, by operation of law, modify or revoke the ruling or protest review decision by CBP. As such, the outcome of the modification proceeding at the Commission will have a direct impact on CBP’s views of the admissibility of the merchandise at issue in this protest, regardless of the outcome of this protest or any appeal therefrom. In the filings, Protestant designated certain information as confidential. U.S. Customs and Border Protection is guided in this regard by the laws relating to confidentiality and disclosure to include, for example, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), as amended (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Trade Secrets Act (“TSA”) (18 U.S.C. § 1905) and/or the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (5 U.S.C. § 552a). See infra Section III.A. Information bracketed in red [[ ]] in this letter will be redacted from the public version. A public version of this decision is enclosed for your files. BACKGROUND U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 As discussed below in Section I.B.1, the limited exclusion order issued in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016 prohibits, inter alia, the unlicensed entry of access control systems and components thereof that infringe one or more of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 (“the ’319 patent”). See Inv. No. 337-TA-1016 Limited Exclusion Order (March 23, 2018) (“1016 LEO”). The Chamberlain Group, Inc. is listed as the assignee of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319. See Exh. H of Protest (U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319). Specification The specification of the ’319 patent states that “[t]he invention relates in general to movable barrier operators and in particular to movable barrier operators such as garage door operators or gate operators which include passive infrared detectors associated with them for detecting the presence of a person or other high temperature object for controlling a function of the movable barrier operator such as illumination.” Exh. H of Protest at 1:14–20. The specification of the ’319 patent further states that “[i]t is a principal aspect of the present invention to provide a quickly and easily retrofitted passive infrared detector for controlling the illumination of a garage door operator through conventional signaling channels.” Id. at 2:64–67 (emphasis added). Figure 1 of the ’319 patent, reproduced below, depicts a moveable barrier operator embodying the invention. Id. at 3:42–43.
Figure 1 of the ’319 Patent Figure 1 shows a garage door operator 10, positioned within a garage 12. Id. at 3:44–46. The garage door operator 10 is mounted to a ceiling 14 of a garage 12 for operation of a multipanel garage door 16. Id. at 3:46–49. The garage door operator 10 includes a head unit 24 for providing motion to the garage door 16 via a rail assembly 26. Id. at 3:47–49. Figure 2, reproduced below, shows the relationship between major electrical systems of a portion of the garage door operator shown in Figure 1. Id. at 3:16–18. A wall control unit 60 communicates over a line 62 with a head unit microcontroller 56 to effect control of a garage door operator motor 70 and a light 72 via relay logic 74 connected to the microcontroller 56. Id. at 3:63–4:9. Figure 4, not reproduced herein, shows the wall control unit 60 includes a wall control microcontroller 110, which provides an output to the line 62, which is connected to the microcontroller 56 in the garage door operator head. Id. at 4:22–32.
Figure 2 of the ’319 Patent Prosecution History The ’319 patent issued from U.S. Patent Application No. 10/717,263 (“the ’263 application”), filed on November 19, 2003. The first office action issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office included a rejection of all of the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement. See Office Action of September 22, 2004. The examiner’s enablement rejection was not specific to any particular claim limitation, but was instead a sweeping request for a showing of support for the entirety of the claimed subject matter: The claim(s) contains subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to enable one skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and/or use the invention. The Examiner could not find any thread of support in the Specification for the filed claims. Office Action of September 22, 2004, at 2. In response, the applicant submitted the following claim chart mapping the claims to the specification:
Response of March 22, 2005 at Appendix. The applicant further stated with regard to the term “digital data bus” in application claims 1 and 11 (patent claims 1 and 9) “the applicant includes a definition of ‘digital’ from the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Response of March 22, 2005 at 5. From this definition it is clear that applicant’s line 62 conveys data in accordance with definition 3 that is ‘relating to discrete units’. Id. The transmission of such discrete units is discussed as generating an on-off output code in paragraph 39 of the description.” Id. No amendments were made to application claims 1 or 11 (patent claims 1 and 9). The examiner subsequently withdrew the enablement rejection and eventually allowed application claims 1 and 11 to pass to issuance as patent claims 1 and 9, without any amendments to either one of these particular claims. See Notice of Allowance of September 1, 2006. Claims at Issue The scope of the limited exclusion order issued in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016 extends to claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. Claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent are independent claims. See 1016 LEO. Independent claim 1 recites: 1. An improved garage door opener comprising a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door, said motor drive unit having a microcontroller and a wall console, said wall console having a microcontroller, said microcontroller of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller of the wall console by means of a digital data bus. Independent claim 9 recites: 9. An improved garage door opener comprising a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door, said motor drive unit having a controller and a wall console, said wall console having a controller, said controller of said motor drive unit being connected to the controller of the wall console by means of a digital data bus. The sole difference between claims 1 and 9 is that claim 9 recites “controller” where claim 1 recites “microcontroller.” On a limitation by limitation basis, claims 1 and 9 can be represented as follows: Limitation Claim Language  A An improved garage door opener comprising  B a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door,  C said motor drive unit having a microcontroller [controller] and  D a wall console,  E said wall console having a microcontroller [controller],  F said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus.   ITC Investigation No. 337-TA-1016 Procedural History at the ITC The Commission instituted Investigation No. 337-TA-1016 on August 9, 2016 based on a complaint filed by Chamberlain. 81 Fed. Reg. 52713 (August 9, 2016); Commission Opinion Dated March 23, 2018 (“Comm’n Op.”) at 1–3. The complaint alleged violations of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 1337), in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, and the sale within the United States after importation of certain access control systems and components thereof by reason of infringement of one or more of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 (“the ’319 patent”); claims 1, 10–12, and 18–25 of U.S. Patent No. 7,196,611 (“the ’611 patent”); and claims 7, 11–13, 15–23, and 34–36 of U.S. Patent No. 7,339,336 (“the ’336 patent”). Id. The notice of investigation named as respondents Ryobi Technologies Inc. of Anderson, South Carolina; Techtronic Industries Company Ltd. of Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong; Techtronic Industries North America Inc. of Hunt Valley, Maryland; One World Technologies, Inc. of Anderson, South Carolina; OWT Industries, Inc. of Pickens, South Carolina; and ET Technology (Wuxi) Co., Ltd., of Zhejiang, China. Id. The Office of Unfair Import Investigations was not a party to the investigation. Id. On October 27, 2016, the ITC determined not to review the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) order (Order No. 4), which granted a motion to amend the Notice of Investigation to include two additional respondents: Techtronic Trading Limited of Kwai Chung, Hong Kong; and Techtronic Industries Factory Outlets Inc., d/b/a Direct Tools Factory Outlet of Anderson, South Carolina. Comm’n Op. at 3. On November 7, 2016, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s order (Order No. 6) terminating the investigation as to Ryobi Technologies Inc. of Anderson, South Carolina. Comm’n Op. at 3. Ryobi Technologies was terminated from the investigation because it no longer existed as an independent entity. Id. It was absorbed by Respondent One World Technologies, Inc. of Anderson, South Carolina. Id. On March 15, 2017, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s order (Order No. 15) granting a motion to terminate the investigation as to Techtronic Trading Limited of Kwai Chung, Hong Kong; and Techtronic Industries Factory Outlets Inc., d/b/a Direct Tools Factory Outlet of Anderson, South Carolina. Comm’n Op. at 3–4. On March 20, 2017, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s order (Order No. 18) granting a motion to terminate the investigation as to claims 10, 19–20, and 22 of the ’611 patent and claims 7, 11–13, 15–18, 35, and 36 of the ’336 patent. Comm’n Op. at 4. On May 3, 2017, the ITC determined to review the ALJ’s order (Order No. 23) granting respondents’ motion for summary determination of non-infringement of the ’319 patent. Comm’n Op. at 4. On review, the ITC construed “wall console” as a “wall-mounted control unit,” vacated Order No. 23, and remanded the investigation as to the ’319 patent to the ALJ for further proceedings. Comm’n Op. at 4 (citing Comm’n Op. (May 5, 2017) at 1–2). On May 31, 2017, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s order (Order No. 28) granting a motion to terminate the investigation as to all the pending claims of the ’611 patent. Comm’n Op. at 4. On November 9, 2017, the ITC determined not to review the ALJ’s order (order No. 36) granting a motion to terminate the investigation as to certain accused products and claims 19–23 of the ’336 patent. Comm’n Op. at 5. On October 23, 2017, the ALJ issued his final Initial Determination (“ID”) finding a violation of section 337 by respondents with respect to claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. 83 Fed. Reg. 13517 (March 29, 2018); Comm’n Op. at 5. The ALJ found that the accused products directly infringe asserted claims 1–4, 7–12, 15 and 16 of the ’319 patent, and that respondents induce infringement of those claims. Comm’n Op. at 5. The ALJ also found that respondents failed to establish that the asserted claims of the ’319 patent were invalid for obviousness. Id. The parties appealed to the Commission, which determined to review the ID in-part. Id. Specifically, for the ’319 patent the Commission determined to review (1) the ID's finding that a combination of prior art references Doppelt, Jacobs, and Gilbert fail to render the asserted claims obvious; and (2) the ID's finding that a combination of prior art references Matsuoka, Doppelt, and Eckel fail to render the asserted claims obvious. See Notice of Comm’n Op. (March 23, 2018). On March 23, 2018, the Commission issued their final determination finding a violation of section 337. See Notice of Comm’n Op. (March 23, 2018). For the ’319 patent the Commission determined to (1) affirm the ALJ’s finding that a combination of prior art references Doppelt, Jacobs, and Gilbert fail to render the asserted claims obvious and (2) affirm the ALJ's finding that a combination of prior art references Matsuoka, Doppelt, and Eckel fail to render the asserted claims obvious, but reverse the ALJ’s finding that Eckel is analogous art. Id. Accordingly, having found a violation of section 337 in this investigation, the Commission determined that the appropriate form of relief was, inter alia, a limited exclusion order prohibiting the unlicensed entry of access control systems and components thereof that infringe one or more of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent that are manufactured by, or on behalf of, or are imported by or on behalf of respondents (i.e., Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd.; Techtronic Industries North America Inc.; One Word Technologies, Inc.; OWT Industries, Inc.; and Et Technology (Wuxi) Co., Ltd. (collectively, “TTi”)) or any of their affiliated companies, parents, subsidiaries, agents, or other related business entities, or their successors or assigns, for the remaining term of the ’319 patent except under license of the patent owner or as provided by law (“1016 LEO”). See Notice of Comm’n Op. (March 23, 2018); 1016 LEO; Comm’n Op. at 2. Claim Construction at the ITC The ITC construed the following claim terms of the ’319 patent: ’319 Patent  Term / Phrase ITC Construction  wall console plain and ordinary meaning: ‘a wall-mounted control unit’ (Exh. B of Protest (ALJ’s Final Initial Determination, Doc ID 626478 (Oct. 2017)) at 120-21).  digital data bus plain and ordinary meaning which is ‘a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data’ (Id. at 123).  controller plain and ordinary meaning which is ‘any type of control device’ (Id. at 124).  motor drive unit unit where a driven motor resides (Id. at 128).   The Accused Products at the ITC During the underlying investigation, Chamberlain accused TTi’s GD200, GD200A, and GD125 garage door openers (“’319 Accused Products”) of infringing the asserted claims of the ’319 patent. Exh. A of Protest (Comm’n Op., Doc ID 639786 (Mar. 2018)) at 9; Exh. B of Protest at 8. The ’319 Accused Products bear the Ryobi® brand. Exh. A of Protest at 9; Exh. B of Protest at 4. The parties agreed to treat the GD200 as representative of the GD200A and GD125 for purposes of conducting the infringement analysis. Exh. B of Protest at 8. The ITC determined that: (i) the head unit of the ’319 Accused Products includes at least two microcontrollers (or controllers)—a [[ ]] (ii) that the ’319 Accused Products include an [[ ]], and (iii) that the [[ ]] and communicates digitally over a wired connection. Id. at 135. Infringement Analysis at the ITC The ALJ found “that the ’319 Accused Products, represented by the GD200, have been shown to infringe claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent.” Id. at 129. The ALJ further noted that “the breadth of these patent claims makes it easy to infringe. Independent claims 1 and 9 simply require microcontrollers [or controllers] in a garage door opener’s ‘motor drive unit’ and wall console, with digital communication between them” and that a “non-infringing product – which avoids infringement by, for example, omitting a microcontroller in either location – would likely have meaningfully reduced functionality.” Id. at 129–130 (citing ’319 patent at claims 1, 9). The ALJ’s limitation-by-limitation analysis of independent claims 1 and 9 is as follows, using the limitation notation set forth above in Section I.A.3, for ease of reference: “An improved garage door opener comprising” The ITC found that there was no dispute that the GD200 was a garage door opener. Id. at 130 (“CGI [i.e., Chamberlain] argues the GD200 is a garage door opener and this is undisputed.”). “a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door” The ALJ found “no genuine dispute that the ’319 Accused Products meet this limitation [i.e., “a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door”].”  Id. at 130-31. The ITC noted that Chamberlain contended that the head unit of the ’319 Accused Products was the motor drive unit “because it contains the motor and other components for opening and closing a garage door, as the claim recites” and that respondents opposition does not dispute this fact. Id. at 130–32 (internal quotations omitted). “said motor drive unit having a microcontroller [controller]” Notably, Respondents argued that “the [[ ]] is not a microcontroller of the motor drive unit because it does not control or drive the motor for opening and closing the garage door.” Id. at 132. Nevertheless, the ALJ again saw no genuine dispute, explaining “I find the ‘motor drive unit’ is not limited to exactly that structure, subsystem, electrical board, etc. that controls the motor. Rather it is ‘a unit where a driven motor resides’ and it is undisputed that within the head unit of the ’319 Accused Products, there is a microcontroller.” Id. at 133. In fact, the ALJ notes, [[ ]] Id. The GD200’s [[ ]] are pictured below (RX-332C at Fig. 3): [[ ]] Id. at 131–33. “a wall console” The ALJ determined that it was undisputed that the GD200 includes “a wall console.” Id. at 133. “said wall console having a microcontroller [controller]” The ALJ determined that it was undisputed that the GD200 includes the feature of a wall console having a microcontroller [or controller]. Id. at 133–34. “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus” With respect to the final limitation, “said microcontroller [or controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller of the wall console by means of a digital data bus” the ALJ concluded that this limitation was met. Id. at 134–35. The ALJ found that this limitation was met because it was “undisputed that [[ ]] and communicates digitally over that wired connection (i.e., a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data).” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Notably, Respondents argued that this limitation was not met because the [[ ]] could not constitute the motor drive unit’s microcontroller. Id. ([[ ]], which . . . is not the motor drive unit’s microcontroller.”). Respondents further argued that even if the ALJ considered “whether there [was] a connection between the Indoor Keypad’s microcontroller and the GDO Board’s microcontroller, the accused products still would not infringe.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Respondents explained that the [[ ]] along with their products’ use of [[ ]] which “‘cause an intentional ‘break’ in the electrical conduction’ . . . defeat[ed] the ‘conductor’ aspect of ‘digital data bus.’” Id. The ALJ was not persuaded by this line of reasoning, and stated: Even under Respondents’ interpretation of “motor drive unit,” the limitation is still met. The presence of [[ ]] does not negate the presence of “conductors” also in the [[ ]] which is all the claim requires. It has not been alleged the entire end-to-end link is [[ ]] which would create a colorable argument. The same logic applies for the [[ ]] Id. at 135 (emphasis added). In accordance with the above, the ALJ concluded that the ’319 Accused Products infringed independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. Id. at 135. Part 177 Proceeding before the IPR Branch Procedural History of the Part 177 Proceeding On March 30, 2018, Techtronic Industries Co. Ltd, Techtronic Industries North America Inc., One World Technologies, Inc., OWT Industries, Inc., and Et Technology (Wuxi) Co., Ltd. (collectively, “TTi”) submitted a letter requesting an administrative ruling pursuant to 19 C.F.R. part 177, which included exhibits A–R (collectively, “Ruling Request”). The question presented in the Ruling Request was whether “the redesigned models of [TTi’s] Ryobi Ultra-Quiet Garage Door Opener and components thereof”, namely the Ryobi GD126 and GD201 garage door openers, are subject to the limited exclusion order (“1016 LEO”) issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016. See Exh. D of Protest (Ruling Request) at 1, 9. The request for an administrative ruling was conducted on an inter partes basis by CBP. See Exh. F of Protest (HQ Ruling H295697) at 1. The inter partes proceeding involved the two parties with a direct and demonstrable interest in the question presented by the ruling request: (1) TTi; and (2) The Chamberlain Group, Inc. (“Chamberlain”). See, e.g., Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 1; Exh. D of Protest at 1, 4–5; Exh. A of Protest (Comm’n Op., Doc ID 639786 (Mar. 2018)) at 2–3. TTi and Chamberlain entered into a nondisclosure agreement and agreed to a procedural schedule and to service by email. See, e.g., CBP Email to Parties Dated April 18, 2018. On May 7, 2018, Chamberlain served a response to the Ruling Request, which included exhibits A–K (collectively, “Chamberlain Response”). On May 14, 2018, TTi served a reply to the Chamberlain Response, which included exhibits A–C (collectively, “TTi Reply”). On May 18, 2018, Chamberlain served a sur-reply to the TTi Reply, which included exhibit L (collectively, “Chamberlain Sur-Reply”). Both parties presented arguments to CBP during the inter partes proceeding held on May 25. Both parties subsequently served post-proceeding briefs on June 1, 2018. TTi’s post-proceeding brief included exhibits A–D. On July 20, 2018 the IPR Branch issued a ruling letter pursuant to 19 C.F.R. part 177, which held that the Ryobi GD126 and GD201 garage door openers are subject to the limited exclusion order issued by the ITC in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016. See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 1 and 35. The Products at Issue in the Part 177 Proceeding The products at issue in TTi’s ruling request were the Ryobi GD126 and GD201 garage door openers (“the redesigned GDOs”). Exh. D of Protest at 9. The relevant facts for the purposes of the ruling were identical for both models. Chamberlain notes, and TTi did not appear to dispute, that the Ryobi GD126 and GD201 “are the same in relevant respects.” Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 106:16–107:3 (Chamberlain); see also Exh. O of Protest (Chamberlain Response) at 9 n.5 (“All arguments made herein concerning the redesigned GD201 also apply to the redesigned GD126 model.”); Exh. M of Protest at 10:11–13 (TTi) (Agreeing that for both the GD201 and GD126 “the head unit itself did not change, it’s only the wall counsel [sic] that changed.”). The Ryobi GD126 and GD201 garage door openers are based respectively on the Ryobi GD125 and GD200 garage door openers accused and found to infringe certain claims of the ’319 patent at the ITC. See, e.g., Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 8–10; Exhibits G and K from the Chamberlain Response (pictures of the physical samples of the redesigned GDOs provided to Chamberlain showing that the GD201 and GD126 head units have GD200 and GD125 labeling stickers, respectively). The redesigned GDOs differ from the garage door openers (“GDOs”) before the ITC, i.e., the ’319 Accused Products, in the way the wall mounted, indoor keypad is connected to the head unit. Turning first to the GDOs before the ITC, i.e., the ’319 Accused Products, the parties agreed to treat the GD200 as representative of the GD200A and GD125 for purposes of conducting the infringement analysis. Exh. B of Protest (ALJ’s Final Initial Determination, Doc ID 626478 (Oct. 2017)) at 8. As can be seen in the table below, the GD200 includes a pair of wires that extend from the wall-mounted keypad to a wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. GDO Determined to be Infringing at the ITC - GD200 Wall Mounted Keypad with End-to-End Wire Connection to Head Unit  


 See ITC Complaint Ex. 26, at 33.   Turning now to the redesigned GDOs at issue in the ruling, the wall-mounted keypad and the pair of wires that extend from the wall-mounted keypad to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit are replaced with a wireless, wall-mounted keypad, a wireless receiver, and a pair of wires that extends from the wireless receiver to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit, as shown in the table, below. Redesigned GDOs at issue before CBP  GD126 Wireless Wall-Mounted Keypad and Wireless Receiver GD201 Wireless Wall-Mounted Keypad and Wireless Receiver  

 See Chamberlain Ex. I See Chamberlain Ex. H   Notably, the head units in the redesigned GDOs are identical to the head units of the ’319 Accused Products, which were found by the ITC to infringe claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. See Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 7:9–10:9 (conceding that “[t]he head unit itself did not change, it’s only the wall [console] that changed.”); see also Chamberlain Post-Proceeding Br. at 4–6. As shown in the table below, the wireless receivers of the redesigned GDOs include a pair of wires that extend to a wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. In this regard, the connection from the wireless receiver to the head unit in the redesigned GDOs is identical to the connection from the wall-mounted keypad to the head unit in the ’319 Accused Products—a pair of wires that extends to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. Redesigned GDOs at issue before CBP  GD201 Wall Mounted Wireless Keypad and Wireless Receiver, with Wireless Receiver Connected to Head Unit by a Pair of Wires  

 See Chamberlain Ex. H  GD126 Wall Mounted Wireless Keypad and Wireless Receiver, with Wireless Receiver Connected to Head Unit by a Pair of Wires  

 See Chamberlain Ex. I   The extent of the redesign was well summarized by Chamberlain, who stated “the only noticeable difference between the adjudged infringing GDOs [i.e., the ’319 Accused Products] and the Redesigned GDOs is that the path from the Redesigned GDOs’ head unit to the wall console is no longer wired end-to-end.” Exh. O of Protest (Chamberlain Response) at 10. “Instead, the Redesigned GDOs maintain the wired keypad connection at the head unit, which then passes through a separate transceiver that completes the connection to the wall console using wireless signals.” Id. Infringement Analysis from the Part 177 Proceeding The IPR Branch found that TTi did not meet its burden to establish that the Ryobi GD126 and GD201 garage door openers, the redesigned GDOs, do not infringe the intellectual property at issue in the 1016 LEO (i.e., any of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319). See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 35. Specifically, the IPR Branch found that the redesigned GDOs appear to meet all of the limitations of at least independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent, and TTi did not meet its burden to establish that the redesigned GDOs do not infringe these claims. Id. The IPR Branch’s limitation-by-limitation analysis of independent claims 1 and 9 is as follows, using the limitation notation set forth above in Section I.A.3, for ease of reference: Undisputed Claim Limitations A-E Counsel for TTi conceded that the redesigned GDOs meet Limitations A-E of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. Starting with Limitation A, TTi admitted that the redesigned GDOs retain the same head unit as the ’319 Accused Products. See Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 7:9–10:9; Chamberlain Post-Proceeding Br., at 4–6. Thus, as in the underlying investigation, it was undisputed that the redesigned GDOs are garage door openers. See Exh. B of Protest (ALJ’s Final Initial Determination, Doc ID 626478 (Oct. 2017)) at 130–35. With respect to Limitations B-E, counsel for TTi conceded that each of these limitations is met by the redesigned GDOs, as set forth in the claim chart, below: Limitation Claim Language   B a motor drive unit for opening and closing a garage door, IPR BRANCH: So let’s look at it on a limitation-by-limitation basis to fully understand what limitation you would have to say is not met. So here in your redesign articles [i.e., the GDOs at issue] you have a motor drive unit including a motor for opening and closing a garage door, correct? TTi: We do, yes. Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 37:8–14.  C said motor drive unit having a microcontroller [controller] and IPR BRANCH: You have a microcontroller, “said motor drive unit having a microcontroller.” So you have a microcontroller? TTi: Yes. As the ALJ has interpreted, we do have a microcontroller in the head unit. Exh. M of Protest at 37:15–20.  D a wall console, IPR BRANCH: Very good. And you have a wall console in your redesigned articles? TTi: We do have a wall console, yes. Exh. M of Protest at 37:21–38:2.  E said wall console having a microcontroller [controller], IPR BRANCH: And the wall console has a microcontroller? TTi: It does, yes. Exh. M of Protest at 38:3–5.   Accordingly, the IPR Branch found that the redesigned GDOs met Limitations A-E of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 24-25. Disputed Claim Limitation F: “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus” Claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent recite “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus.” Determining patent infringement requires two steps. Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1316 (2015). The first is to construe the limitations of the asserted claims and the second is to compare the properly construed claims to the accused product. Id. In the underlying investigation, the ALJ determined that the phrase “digital data bus” should have its plain and ordinary meaning which is ‘a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data.” Exh. B of Protest (ALJ’s Final Initial Determination, Doc ID 626478 (Oct. 2017)) at 123. Accordingly, the IPR Branch applied the ALJ’s claim construction to Limitation F and determined that Limitation F of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent requires that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit be connected to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console by means of a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data. In the underlying investigation, the ALJ found that the ’319 Accused Products meet Limitation F because it was undisputed that [[ ]] and communicates digitally over a wired connection (i.e., a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data). Exh. B of Protest at 134–35. As shown below, that “wired connection” includes a pair of wires that extend from the wall-mounted keypad to a wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. GDO Determined to be Infringing at the ITC - GD200 Wall Mounted Keypad with End-to-End Wire Connection to Head Unit  


 See Complaint Ex. 26, at 33.   Turning now to the redesigned GDOs at issue in the ruling, the wall-mounted keypad and the pair of wires that extend from the wall-mounted keypad to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit are replaced with a wireless, wall-mounted keypad, a wireless receiver, and a pair of wires that extends from the wireless receiver to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit, as shown in the table, below. The redesigned GDOs replace wall-mounted keypad and the pair of wires that extend from wall mounted keypad to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit of the ’319 Accused Products with a wireless, wall-mounted keypad, a wireless receiver, and a pair of wires that extends from the wireless receiver to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. The head units in the redesigned GDOs are identical to the head units of the ’319 Accused Products, which were found by the ITC to infringe claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. See Exh. M of Protest at 7:9–10:9 (conceding that “[t]he head unit itself did not change, it’s only the wall [console] that changed.”); see also Chamberlain Post-Proceeding Br., at 4–6. As shown in the table below, the wireless receivers of the redesigned GDOs include a pair of wires that extend to a wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. Thus, the connection from the wireless receiver to the head unit in the redesigned GDOs is identical to the connection from the wall-mounted keypad to the head unit in the ’319 Accused Products—a pair of wires that extends to the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit. Redesigned GDOs at Issue before CBP  GD201 Wall Mounted Wireless Keypad and Wireless Receiver, with Wireless Receiver Connected to Head Unit by a Pair of Wires  

 See Chamberlain Ex. H  GD126 Wall Mounted Wireless Keypad and Wireless Receiver, with Wireless Receiver Connected to Head Unit by a Pair of Wires  

 See Chamberlain Ex. I   During the oral argument before the IPR Branch, TTi conceded that the pair of wires connecting the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit to the wireless receiver is a digital data bus that connects the wireless receiver to the controller in the head unit. See Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 36:9–37:7, 38:6–10, 40:7–15. Indeed, given that: (i) the head unit of the redesigned GDOs remains unchanged from the ’319 Accused Products, and (ii) a pair of wires connects the head unit of the redesigned GDOs to the wireless receiver in the same manner as a pair of wires connected the head unit to the wired, wall-mounted keypad of the GDOs before the ITC, it follows that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit of the redesigned GDOs is connected to wireless receiver by means of a digital data bus (i.e., a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data). TTi also conceded that that the wireless receiver’s antenna, itself is “a conductor that conveys digital signals.” See id. at 46:20–47:15. TTi further conceded that the microcontroller in the wall console (wireless, wall-mounted keypad) is connected to and conveys digital data to the wireless receiver via wireless communication of the wireless, wall-mounted keypad. See id. at 53:12–54:10. Accordingly, the IPR Branch determined that the combination of the pair of wires connecting the wire terminal labeled “Keypad” on the head unit to the wireless receiver, the wireless receiver, and the wireless, wall-mounted keypad are a group of conductors which connects and conveys digital data between the microcontroller in the wireless, wall-mounted keypad, and the microcontroller in the head unit. Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 25-28. As such, the IPR Branch further determined that the redesigned GDOs meet Limitation F: “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus” recited in claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 28. In the course of the inter partes proceeding, TTi raised several bases for finding that claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent should not be interpreted to encompass a configuration that includes a wireless connection in the communication path between microcontroller (or controller) of the head unit and the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console. Specifically: (1) CBP should not rely on what TTI characterized as dicta from the Initial Determination (“ID”) in the underlying investigation in reaching its determination, (2) Chamberlain is bound by arguments and evidence that it previously submitted to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the ITC that preclude the claims from encompassing the GDOs at issue, (3) the phrase “digital data bus” should be interpreted to exclude wireless connectivity in order to preserve the validity of the claims at issue, and (4) the specification of the ’319 patent lacks written support for construing the claims to encompass the GDOs at issue. See TTi Post Proceeding Br. at 1–2. The IPR Branch addressed each of these arguments in detail in its ruling, finding none to be persuasive. See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 28-35. In view of the foregoing, the IPR Branch found that the redesigned GDOs meet all of the limitations of at least independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent, and TTi did not met its burden to establish that the GDOs at issue do not infringe these claims. Id. at 35. Accordingly, the IPR Branch held that the GDOs at issue are subject to the 1016 LEO. Id. at 35. Modification Proceeding Instituted by the ITC TTi filed a petition for a modification proceeding with the ITC. See TTi’s Petition for a Modification Proceeding Dated August 2, 2018 (“TTi Modification Petition”). In TTi’s petition, TTi requested that the ITC to “institute a modification proceeding to determine whether the redesigned models of the Ryobi® Ultra-Quiet Garage Door Opener and components thereof (the ‘Redesigned GDOs’) are covered by the Limited Exclusion Orders. . . issued by the Commission in the” 1016 Investigation. Id. at 1. In an order dated September 4, 2018, the Commission determined to institute this modification proceeding. Commission Order (Modification Proceeding) Dated September 4, 2018 at 3. The Commission has ordered the Administrative Law Judge designated to preside over this modification proceeding to issue a recommended determination within six months after publication of notice of this Commission Order in the Federal Register. Id. Protestant One World Technologies, Inc. was named as one of the parties to the modification proceeding. Id. Commission determinations under section 337, including all conclusions of law and findings of fact (such as a particular construction of a claim limitation and the corresponding comparison of that construction with features of the products found to infringe) are binding on CBP and will be applied by CBP with preclusive effect against products of a respondent identified in a limited exclusion order. In the event a later-issued Commission determination includes conclusions of law or findings of fact that conflict with a prior-issued ruling by CBP under 19 C.F.R. part 177 or a prior-issued protest review decision by CBP under 19 C.F.R. part 174, the later-issued Commission determination will, by operation of law, modify or revoke the ruling or protest review decision by CBP. As such, the outcome of the modification proceeding at the Commission will have a direct impact on CBP’s views of the admissibility of the merchandise at issue in this protest, regardless of the outcome of this protest or any appeal therefrom. The Products at Issue in TTi’s Petition for a Modification Proceeding The products at issue in TTi’s petition for a modification proceeding are the exact same products that were at issue before the IPR Branch during the Part 177 proceeding. See e.g., TTi Modification Petition at 5 and 16 (“All of the issues with respect to this modification request have already been extensively briefed before Customs. The record is complete, straightforward and requires no additional fact-finding.”) (“[O]n March 30, 2018, Respondents submitted a letter to Customs requesting an administrative ruling pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 177 that the Redesigned GDOs are not covered by the LEO issued in the underlying investigation. Throughout the course of that inter partes proceeding, both Respondents and Chamberlain fully briefed their respective positions on this exact issue. . . .”) (emphasis in the original). In addition, the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers at issue in TTi’s petition for a modification proceeding are the same as the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers that were at issue during the Part 177 proceeding and consequently, the same as the merchandise at issue (i.e., the 936 pieces of Ryobi GD126 garage door openers) in the instant protest. Id.; see also Email from One World Counsel to IPR Branch Dated June 20, 2018; Memorandum in Support of Protest at 2. The Instant Protest (Protest No. 160118100231) CBP received the instant protest, protest no. 160118100231, on August 15, 2018. CBP Form 19. The protesting party is One World Technologies, Inc. Id. One World “is protesting the . . . denial of entry of Entry No. [[ ]].” Id. Entry No. [[ ]] Entry No. [[ ]] consists of 936 pieces of Ryobi 1.25HP Garage Door Openers, customer model number GD126 (i.e., Ryobi GD126 garage door openers). See TTi Packing List. One World Technologies Inc. with an importer no. of [[ ]] was identified as the importer of record. CBP Form 7501 Dated June 26, 2018. The U.S. port of unlading was identified as port 1601 (Charleston, South Carolina). Id.; see also Email from One World Counsel to IPR Branch Dated June 20, 2018. The import date and the entry date were both identified as June 12, 2018. CBP Form 7501 Dated June 26, 2018. The entry type was identified as 01 (consumption entry). Id.; see also https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated/ace-transaction-details. On June 18, 2018, CBP detained the merchandise at issue. See DHS Form 6051D Dated June 20, 2018. In a letter dated June 29, 2018, CBP notified One World that the merchandise at issue was “excluded from entry for consumption into the United States . . . for violation of the exclusion order issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-1016.” CBP Letter to One World Dated June 29, 2018. On July 31, 2018, the ITC issued a seizure and forfeiture order against One World Technologies, Inc. See Seizure and Forfeiture Order against One World Dated July 31, 2018. The Merchandise at Issue in Protest No. 160118100231 The merchandise at issue in the instant protest are 936 pieces of Ryobi 1.25HP Garage Door Openers, customer model number GD126 (i.e., Ryobi GD126 garage door openers). See TTi Packing List. The merchandise at issue in the instant protest is the same as the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers that were the subject of the Part 177 Proceeding before the IPR Branch (and the same as the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers that is the subject of TTi’s petition for a modification proceeding filed at the ITC). See e.g., Email from One World Counsel to IPR Branch Dated June 20, 2018 (“All of the product that has been detained at these two port locations [i.e., Port of Charleston, South Carolina (Port Code 1601), and the Port of Buffalo-Niagara Falls, New York (Port Code 0901)] is GD126 model garage door openers which contain the redesigned wireless indoor keypad that is the subject of our pending Ruling Request. The material we have presented to you in connection with the Ruling Request—including our presentation when we met with you on February 14, 2018—includes a detailed description of the GD126 product and how it has been redesigned in order to avoid the asserted claims of the ‘319 patent.”); see also Memorandum in Support of Protest at 2 (“[T]he question of whether entry of the GDOs at issue is proper has been the subject of extensive proceedings in different venues over the past three years. There are no additional facts to consider and, in fact, the very body ultimately administering this Protest, the Intellectual Property Rights Branch of Customs (“IPRB”), has already considered the issues extensively and issued its decision as to whether the GDOs are subject to the ITC’s remedial orders.”); see also TTi Modification Petition at 5 and 16. Accordingly, for a detailed description of the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers please refer to Section I.C.2. ISSUE: Whether the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers from Entry No. [[ ]] are subject to exclusion for violating the 1016 LEO because they infringe one or more of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. See One World’s Memorandum in Support of Protest at 2; CBP Form 19. LAW AND ANALYSIS Treatment of Confidential Business Information Submitted under 19 C.F.R. pt. 177 As a preliminary matter, Protestant previously requested confidential treatment in connection with the ruling request filed on March 30, 2018 for certain information from its submissions and seeks to have the information in question redacted from any protest review decision that is published in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a). The submissions from the ruling request filed on March 30, 2018 have been filed again as exhibits to the instant protest, hence we will discuss the treatment of confidential business information as it pertains to the ruling request (as it does not appear that Protestant has requested confidential treatment of any additional information outside of what has been requested as part of the ruling request). Disclosure of protest review decisions is governed by 6 C.F.R. part 5 and 19 C.F.R. part 103. See 19 C.F.R. § 174.32. Disclosure of information related to administrative rulings under 19 C.F.R. § 177 is governed by 31 C.F.R. § 1, 19 C.F.R. § 103, and 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a)(3). See 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(a). Moreover, the determination whether to include or redact information within a published ruling is guided by various federal laws—and the relevant standards for their application—that involve confidentiality and disclosure, to include the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C.§ 1905), and the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a). See CBP HQ Ruling H121519 at 1 (dated February 8, 2011). Congress enacted FOIA to overhaul the earlier public-disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act that gradually became more “a withholding statute than a disclosure statute.” Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)). Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favor of disclosure, which is consistent with the purpose as well as the plain language of the Act. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991). Thus, FOIA mandates that an agency disclose certain information unless it falls within one of nine exemptions. Milner, 562 U.S. at 565. These exemptions are “explicitly made exclusive,” EPA, 410 U.S. at 79, and must be “narrowly construed,” FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630 (1982). Exemption 4 of FOIA, which is especially relevant here, provides that FOIA does not apply to matters that are “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4); see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 291 (1979). Furthermore, it is worth noting that, as a general matter, the proscriptions of the Trade Secrets Act are “at least co-extensive with Exemption 4 of FOIA . . . [such that], unless another statute or a regulation authorizes disclosure of the information, the Trade Secrets Act requires each agency to withhold any information it may withhold under Exemption 4 of the FOIA.” Venetian Casino Resort, LLC v. EEOC, 530 F.3d 925, 932 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Canadian Comm. Corp. v. Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234 n.2 (1986) (“Dow's fear that EPA might disclose trade secrets revealed in these photographs appears adequately addressed by federal law prohibiting such disclosure generally under the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, and the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).”). That said, “Congress did not design the Freedom of Information Act exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure.” Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 293, 294 (“We therefore conclude that Congress did not limit an agency's discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA.”); see GTE Sylvania v. Consumers Union of United States, 445 U.S. 375, 378, n. 2 (1980) (“The theory of the so-called ‘reverse Freedom of Information Act’ suit, that the exemptions to the Act were mandatory bars to disclosure and that therefore submitters of information could sue an agency under the Act in order to enjoin release of material, was squarely rejected in Chrysler Corp.”). The test, for administrative rulings under 19 C.F.R pt. 177, to determine whether certain information is confidential (and therefore properly redacted from any published ruling) is identical to the federal government-wide standard for disclosure under FOIA Exemption 4 as it relates to the likelihood of substantial harm to the competitive position of the person submitting the information and requesting that it be withheld from publication. As with FOIA, the basic objective of administrative rulings under 19 C.F.R. pt. 177 favors disclosure to provide notice to interested persons of the reasons for the agency’s position and its decision-making process. See Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 290 n. 10 (“We observed in Department of Air Force v. Rose that ‘disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act.’ The legislative history is replete with references to Congress' desire to loosen the agency's grip on the data underlying governmental decision making.”) (internal citation omitted). Notably, under 19 C.F.R. § 177.8(a)(3) referenced above, there is a general presumption that “[n]o part of the ruling letter, including names, addresses, or information relating to the business transactions of private parties, shall be deemed to constitute privileged or confidential commercial or financial information or trade secrets exempt from disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. 552), unless, as provided in §?177.2(b)(7), the information claimed to be exempt from disclosure is clearly identified and the reasons for the exemption are set forth.” In turn, 19 C.F.R. § 177.2(b)(7) provides that “[i]nformation which is claimed to constitute trade secrets or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information regarding the business transactions of private parties the disclosure of which would cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person making the request (or of another interested party), must be identified clearly and the reasons such information should not be disclosed, including, where applicable, the reasons the disclosure of the information would prejudice the competitive position of the person making the request (or of another interested party) must be set forth.” Significantly, § 177.2(b)(7) was added to this section through rulemaking (T.D. 75-186, 40 Fed. Reg. 31929, July 30, 1975 as amended by T.D. 85-90, 50 FR 21430, May 24, 1985 that promulgated a final rule based on a previous notice of proposed rulemaking (40 Fed. Reg. 2437, January 13, 1975) where the text as proposed did not contain (b)(7) or any other provision addressing the treatment of putative confidential business information. The “substantial harm to a competitive position” standard adopted in § 177.2(b)(7) to handle confidentiality issues is identical to that standard for FOIA Exemption (b)(4) contemporaneously established by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) in National Parks & Conservation Asso. v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See N.H. Right to Life v. HHS, 136 S. Ct. 383; 193 L. Ed. 2d 412; 2015 U.S. LEXIS 7169 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). In 1974, a year before the promulgation of the Customs final rule, the D.C. Circuit construed the word “confidential” in Exemption 4 and determined that commercial information is “confidential” if disclosure would “cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained.” National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770; see also N.H. Right to Life, 136 S. Ct. at 384. The D.C. Circuit later elaborated that, when applying this test, there was no need to show actual competitive harm and that actual competition and the likelihood of substantial competitive injury sufficed. See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also N.H. Right to Life, 136 S. Ct. at 384. Accordingly, to overcome the strong presumption in favor of disclosure, ruling requesters seeking confidential treatment must prove (1) they actually face competition, and that (2) substantial competitive injury would likely result from disclosure. See Gov't Accountability Project v. FDA, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114927, at *15 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Conclusory and generalized allegations of substantial competitive harm are unacceptable and will not support a ruling requester’s efforts to withhold certain information from publication. See Public Citizen Health Research Group, 704 F.2d at 1291. There is no dispute that TTi (which includes One World) faces actual competition and therefore the relevant analysis will focus on the second prong above. See Exh. A of Protest (Comm’n Op., Doc ID 639786 (Mar. 2018)) at 38–40. As suggested above, the relevant Customs regulations not only mirror the general presumption in favor of disclosure but also place the burden on the person requesting confidentiality to demonstrate that such information qualifies. See generally FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965) (upholding a rule requiring public disclosure except where the proponents of a request for confidential treatment have established their burden to justify that such information should not be disclosed). Moreover, the provisions of the Customs regulations that place the burden on the ruling requester to establish, during the administrative proceeding, that the information at issue constitutes confidential business information is consistent with the burden the government must satisfy in an action brought against it under FOIA challenging the position an agency has taken not to disclose information pursuant to one or more of the exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also United States Department of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 171 (1993) (“The Government bears the burden of establishing that the exemption applies.”). This line of inquiry is further illuminated by the “general right to inspect and copy public records and documents” that courts have historically recognized, including in patent cases involving highly sensitive information. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)). The nature of this right, rooted in the common law, is not conditioned on a proprietary interest in the information, see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597, although certainly there are instances where an interest in the information may rise to or approach such a level. Instead, the only interest necessary to compel access to such information is found in the “citizen's desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98. Therefore, a determination whether to grant a request for confidential treatment must balance the likelihood of substantial harm to a competitive position against the need to provide the greatest amount of transparency possible to the agency’s decision- making process. In light of the above, a request for confidential treatment of information submitted in connection with a ruling requested under 19 C.F.R. pt. 177 faces a strong presumption in favor of disclosure. The person seeking this treatment must overcome that presumption with a request that is narrowly tailored and supported by evidence establishing a likelihood of substantial harm to a competitive position that outweighs the general history and public policy—embedded in FOIA, the common law, and the relevant Customs regulations—favoring transparency and disclosure. To that end, any request for confidential treatment must provide a particularized showing of the specific harm that will result if certain information is disclosed. Broad, unsubstantiated allegations of harm without specific examples articulating reasons for the harm will not suffice. Therefore, as noted above, requests for confidential treatment in the context of section 337 exclusion order-based rulings under 19 C.F.R. pt. 177 must be narrowly tailored, fully supported by evidence showing a likelihood of substantial harm to a competitive position, and still permit a description of the device’s operation. Based on the framework above, the information for which TTi has established a likelihood of substantial harm to its competitive position if disclosed (or consists of information that was redacted from the public version of the agency record at the Commission) has been bracketed in red [[ ]] for redaction from the published protest decision. The evidence has otherwise been described or identified to the greatest extent allowed throughout this protest decision (including, whenever possible, with citations referencing the confidential agency record at the Commission from Inv. No. 337-TA-1016). Law of Patent Infringement Determining patent infringement requires two steps. Advanced Steel Recovery, LLC v. X-Body Equip., Inc., 808 F.3d 1313, 1316 (2015). The first is to construe the limitations of the asserted claims and the second is to compare the properly construed claims to the accused product. Id. To establish literal infringement, every limitation recited in a claim must be found in the accused product whereas, under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement occurs when there is equivalence between the elements of the accused product and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Microsoft Corp. v. GeoTag, Inc., 817 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). One way to establish equivalence is by showing, on an element-by-element basis, that the accused product performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same result as each claim limitation of the patented invention, which is often referred to as the function-way-result test. See Intendis GmbH v. Glenmark Pharms., Inc., 822 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As for the first step above, “the proper construction of a patent's claims is an issue of Federal Circuit law[.]” Comcast IP Holdings I LLC v. Sprint Communs. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 3981, at *11 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Moreover, the ultimate construction of a claim limitation is a legal conclusion, as are interpretations of the patent’s intrinsic evidence (the patent claims, specifications, and prosecution history). UltimatePointer, L.L.C. v. Nintendo Co., 816 F.3d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841, 190 L. Ed. 2d 719 (2015); see also Multilayer Stretch Cling Film Holdings, Inc. v. Berry Plastics Corp., 831 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Claim construction is a question of law, reviewed de novo, but any extrinsic fact-finding by the district court in the course of claim construction is reviewed for clear error.”). The second step to establish infringement involves the comparison of the claims to the accused product, which is a question of fact. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 839 F.3d 1034, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (en banc). The scope and meaning of the asserted claims is determined by looking to the words of the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution history, and if necessary, any relevant extrinsic evidence. Advanced Steel Recovery, 808 F.3d at 1315–17. Moreover, claim terms are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is the meaning they would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. Poly-America, L.P. v. API Indus., Inc., 839 F.3d 1131, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc)). “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” UltimatePointer, 816 F.3d at 822 (quoting Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313); see also Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“It is axiomatic that the claim construction process entails more than viewing the claim language in isolation.”). In particular, “the specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Phillips, at 1313 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). However, while claims are read in view of the specification for which they are a part, it is improper to read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the claims. Hill-Rom Servs. v. Stryker Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the ordinary and customary meaning of the claim language generally controls unless the patentee acts as his own lexicographer and provides a special definition for a particular claim term or the patentee disavows the ordinary scope of a claim term either in the specification or during prosecution. InterDigital Communs., LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 690 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Hill-Rom Servs., 755 F.3d at 1371 (“There are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the claim term either in the specification or during prosecution.”) (quoting Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm't Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). The standards for finding lexicography and disavowal are “exacting.” Pacing Techs., LLC v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., 778 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2015). “To act as a lexicographer, a patentee must ‘clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term’ and ‘clearly express an intent to define the term.’” Id. (quoting Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1365. “Similarly, disavowal requires that ‘the specification [or prosecution history] make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature.’” Id. (quoting SciMed Life Sys. Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). For example, disavowal or disclaimer has been found based on “clear and unmistakable statements by the patentee that limit the claims, such as ‘the present invention includes . . .’ or ‘the present invention is . . .’ or ‘all embodiments of the present invention are . . . .’” Id. (citing Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. AGA Med. Corp., 717 F.3d 929, 936 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 (Fed. Cir. 2006); SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d at 1343–44). Ultimately, “[t]he only meaning that matters in claim construction is the meaning in the context of the patent,” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016), and “[l]egal error arises when a court relies on extrinsic evidence that contradicts the intrinsic record.” Ruckus Wireless, Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC, 824 F.3d 999, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 790 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied by Universal Lighting Techs., Inc. v. Lighting Ballast Control, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1226; 194 L. Ed. 2d 185; 2016 U.S. LEXIS 1155 (2016). Therefore, “[t]he construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent's description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. Fujifilm Corp., 778 F.3d 1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (quoting Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998), adopted by Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316). Lastly, only those claim terms that are disputed must be construed and only to the extent necessary to resolve the dispute. See O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362 (2008) (“We, however, recognize that district courts are not (and should not be) required to construe every limitation present in a patent's asserted claims”). Rather, “[c]laim construction is a matter of resolution of disputed meanings and technical scope, to clarify and when necessary to explain what the patentee covered by the claims, for use in the determination of infringement.” Id. (quoting U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 103 F.3d 1554, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Vanderlande Indus. Nederland BV v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 366 F.3d 1311, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2004). C. Section 337 Exclusion Order Administration Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the Commission has authority to conduct investigations into imported articles that allegedly infringe United States patents and impose remedies if the accused articles are found to be infringing. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B), (b)(1), (d), (f), (i). 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), in particular, empowers the Commission to direct the exclusion from entry of articles found to infringe the asserted patents. When the Commission determines there is infringement and thus a violation of section 337, it generally issues one of two types of exclusion orders: (1) a limited exclusion order or (2) a general exclusion order. See Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Both types of orders direct CBP to bar infringing products from entering the country. See Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 535 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed Cir. 2008). “A limited exclusion order is ‘limited’ in that it only applies to the specific parties before the Commission in the investigation. In contrast, a general exclusion order bars the importation of infringing products by everyone, regardless of whether they were respondents in the Commission's investigation.” Id. A general exclusion order is appropriate only if two exceptional circumstances apply. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356. A general exclusion order may only be issued if (1) “necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited exclusion order,” or (2) “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1356 (“If a complainant wishes to obtain an exclusion order operative against articles of non-respondents, it must seek a GEO [general exclusion order] by satisfying the heightened burdens of §§ 1337(d)(2)(A) and (B).”). In addition to the action taken above, the Commission may issue an order under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) directing CBP to seize and forfeit articles attempting entry in violation of an exclusion order if their owner, importer, or consignee previously had articles denied entry on the basis of that exclusion order and received notice that seizure and forfeiture would result from any future attempt to enter articles subject to the same. An exclusion order under § 1337(d)—either limited or general—and a seizure and forfeiture order under § 1337(i) apply at the border only and are operative against articles presented for customs examination or articles conditionally released from customs custody but still subject to a timely demand for redelivery. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d)(1) (“The Commission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action under this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper officers, refuse such entry.”); id. at (i)(3) (“Upon the attempted entry of articles subject to an order issued under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately notify all ports of entry of the attempted importation and shall identify the persons notified under paragraph (1)(C).”) (emphasis added); see also ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“This section [1337(i)] permits the Commission to exclude ‘articles’ from importation into the United States; however, it is difficult to see how one could physically stop electronic transmissions at the borders under the current statutory scheme…. A construction of the term ‘articles’ that includes electronically transmitted digital data is also not reasonable when applied to Section 337(i)(3). This section reads, ‘[u]pon the attempted entry of articles subject to an order issued under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately notify all ports of entry of the attempted importation and shall identify the persons notified under paragraph (1)(C).’ Not only can an electronic transmission not be subject to an ‘attempted entry’ through a ‘port of entry,’ it also cannot be intercepted at a ‘port of entry’ as contemplated in the statute.”) (emphasis added), reh’ng en banc denied by Clearcorrect Operating v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 819 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Significantly, unlike district court injunctions, the Commission can issue a general exclusion order that broadly prohibits entry of articles that infringe the relevant claims of an asserted patent without regard to whether the persons importing such articles were parties to, or were related to parties to, the investigation that led to issuance of the general exclusion order. See Vastfame Camera, Ltd. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Commission also has recognized that even limited exclusion orders have broader applicability beyond just the parties found to infringe during an investigation. See Certain GPS Devices and Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-602, Comm’n Op. at 17, n. 6, Doc ID 317981 (Jan. 2009) (“We do not view the Court’s opinion in Kyocera as affecting the issuance of LEOs [limited exclusion orders] that exclude infringing products made by respondents found to be violating Section 337, but imported by another entity. The exclusionary language in this regard that is traditionally included in LEOs is consistent with 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)–(D) and 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).”). However, this is not the only difference between district court injunctions under section 283 of the Patent Act and Commission exclusion orders under section 337 of the Tariff Act. For example, the traditional test for injunctive relief, used by district courts in accordance with the Supreme Court’s eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), opinion “does not apply to Commission remedy determinations under Section 337.” Spansion, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). This difference between exclusion orders under Section 337 and injunctions under the Patent Act follows “the long-standing principle that importation is treated differently than domestic activity.” Id. at 1360 (citing United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (“Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’ Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.”); see Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (“As a result of the complete power of Congress over foreign commerce, it necessarily follows that no individual has a vested right to trade with foreign nations, which is so broad in character as to limit and restrict the power of Congress to determine what articles of merchandise may be imported into this country and the terms upon which a right to import may be exercised. This being true, it results that a statute which restrains the introduction of particular goods into the United States from considerations of public policy does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, in the district courts, the criteria for adjudicating a violation of an injunction against future infringement by a party whose legacy products have already been adjudged to infringe requires application of the colorable differences test. TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Corp., 646 F.3d 869, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). Under this test, if new or redesigned products are so different from the product previously found to infringe (focusing not on differences randomly chosen between the two but on the specific features of the product found to infringe in the earlier infringement trial), such that they raise a fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct, the new or redesigned products are deemed to be more than colorably different from the legacy one adjudged to be infringing and violation of the injunction at this point would not be the appropriate consideration. Instead, a new trial would be required to litigate the infringement question. Id. at 881–83. The initial inquiry under the colorable differences test, therefore, focuses on whether the modification in question is significant. Id. Exclusion orders, however, apply to any articles—new, modified, or otherwise— that are “covered by” the patent claims included in the exclusion order. See Certain Optical Disk Controller Chips and Chipsets, Inv. No. 337-TA-506, Comm’n Op. at 56–57, USITC Pub. 3935, Doc ID 287263 (July 2007) (“The Commission's long-standing practice is to direct its remedial orders to all products covered by the patent claims as to which a violation has been found, rather than limiting its orders only to those specific models selected for the infringement analysis...[W]hile individual models may be evaluated to determine importation and infringement, the Commission's jurisdiction extends to all models of infringing products that are imported at the time of the Commission's determination and to all such products that will be imported during the life of the remedial orders.”). The Commission has confirmed that this requires CBP to employ the traditional two-step test for patent infringement, and not the colorable differences test from TiVo, when administering a Commission exclusion order under section 337 to determine whether an imported article, or one at issue in a ruling request, is within the scope of that exclusion order. See Certain Sleep-Disordered Breathing Treatment Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-879, Advisory Opinion at 10, n. 2, Doc ID 539875 (Aug. 2014); see also Certain Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories, Inv. No. 337-TA-276, Enforcement Proceeding, Comm’n Op. at 11, Doc ID 43536 (Aug. 1991) (“The Commission has always issued its orders in terms of ‘infringing’ products, and has always intended them, as in this case, to prohibit to future importation or sale of products which were not specifically adjudged infringing in the violation proceeding, but do in fact infringe. The Commission has consistently issued exclusion orders coextensive with the violation of section 337 found to exist. Thus, in cases where the violation found involves infringement of patent claims, the Commission has consistently ordered the exclusion of articles which infringe the relevant patent claims.”) (emphasis added). Lastly, despite the well-established principle that “the burden of proving infringement generally rests upon the patentee,” Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843; 187 L. Ed. 2d 703; 2014 U.S. LEXIS 788 (2014), the Commission has held that Medtronic is not controlling precedent and does not overturn its longstanding practice of placing the burden of proof on the party who, in light of the issued exclusion order, is seeking to have an article entered for consumption. See Certain Sleep- Disordered Breathing Treatment Systems and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA- 879, Advisory Opinion at 6–11. In particular, the Commission has noted that “[t]he Federal Circuit has upheld a Commission remedy which effectively shifted the burden of proof on infringement issues to require a company seeking to import goods to prove that its product does not infringe, despite the fact that, in general, the burden of proof is on the patent to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a given article does infringe the patent in question.” Certain Integrated Circuit Telecommunication Chips, Inv. No. 337-TA-337, Comm’n Op. at 21, n.14, USITC Pub. 2670, Doc ID 217024 (Aug. 1993), (emphasis in original) (citing Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 988–89 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). This approach is supported by Federal Circuit precedent. See Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Indeed, we have recognized, and Hyundai does not dispute, that in an appropriate case the Commission can impose a general exclusion order that binds parties and non-parties alike and effectively shifts to would-be importers of potentially infringing articles, as a condition of entry, the burden of establishing noninfringement. The rationale underlying the issuance of general exclusion orders—placing the risk of unfairness associated with a prophylactic order upon potential importers rather than American manufacturers that, vis-a-vis at least some foreign manufacturers and importers, have demonstrated their entitlement to protection from unfair trade practices—applies here [in regard to a limited exclusion order] with increased force.”) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Application of the 1016 LEO to the merchandise at issue The limited exclusion order directs CBP to exclude certain access control systems and components thereof; specifically paragraph 1 of the 1016 LEO states: Access control systems and components thereof that infringe one or more of claims 1-4, 7-12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 (“the ’319 patent”) that are manufactured by, or on behalf of, or are imported by or on behalf of Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd.; Techtronic Industries North America, Inc.; One World Technologies, Inc.; OWT Industries, Inc.; or Et Technology (Wuxi) Co. or any of their affiliated companies, parents, subsidiaries, agents, or other related business entities, or their successors or assigns, are excluded from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse for consumption, for the remaining terms of the ’319 patent except under license of the patent owner or as provided by law. For ease of reference, the conditions of paragraph 1 of the 1016 LEO can be represented as follows: Condition 1016 LEO Paragraph 1  1 Access control systems and components thereof  2 that infringe one or more of claims 1-4, 7-12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 (“the ’319 patent”)  3 that are manufactured by, or on behalf of, or are imported by or on behalf of Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd.; Techtronic Industries North America, Inc.; One World Technologies, Inc.; OWT Industries, Inc.; or Et Technology (Wuxi) Co. or any of their affiliated companies, parents, subsidiaries, agents, or other related business entities, or their successors or assigns,  4 are excluded from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse for consumption,  5 for the remaining terms of the ’319 patent  6 except under license of the patent owner or as provided by law.   As shown below, we find that all the conditions of paragraph 1 of the 1016 LEO have been met. Accordingly, we find that the merchandise at issue is subject to the limited exclusion order issued in ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-1016. “Access control systems and components thereof” The 936 pieces of Ryboi GD126 garage door openers (i.e., the merchandise at issue) are access control systems. The “access control systems” accused and found to infringe the ’319 patent were “garage door openers . . . i.e., the Ryobi GD200, GD200A, and GD125.” See Exh. A of Protest (Comm’n Op., Doc ID 639786 (Mar. 2018)) at pp. 1–2; 5; 9. As described, this shipment appears to contain 936 Ryobi GD-126 garage door openers as they are manifested and labeled as such. See, e.g., IMG_0523.jpg (Machinery CEE’s email dated June 18, 2018); TTI Packing List (provided as part of the Entry Summary); and Machinery CEE’s email no. 2 dated June 18, 2018. “that infringe one or more of claims 1-4, 7-12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319 (“the ’319 patent”)” In CBP HQ Ruling H295697, we found that the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers met all of the limitations of at least independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. See Section I.C.3 and Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697). The merchandise at issue in the instant protest is the same as the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers that were the subject of TTi’s Ruling Request submitted to CBP on March 30, 2018. See e.g., Email from One World Counsel to IPR Branch Dated June 20, 2018 (“All of the product that has been detained at these two port locations [i.e., Port of Charleston, South Carolina (Port Code 1601), and the Port of Buffalo-Niagara Falls, New York (Port Code 0901)] is GD126 model garage door openers which contain the redesigned wireless indoor keypad that is the subject of our pending Ruling Request. The material we have presented to you in connection with the Ruling Request—including our presentation when we met with you on February 14, 2018—includes a detailed description of the GD126 product and how it has been redesigned in order to avoid the asserted claims of the ‘319 patent.”). Moreover, Protestant has made it explicitly clear that “[t]here are no additional facts to consider.” See Memorandum in Support of Protest at 2 (“[T]he question of whether entry of the GDOs at issue is proper has been the subject of extensive proceedings in different venues over the past three years. There are no additional facts to consider . . . .”). Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth in detail in CBP HQ Ruling H295697, we find that the merchandise at issue infringes one or more of claims 1-4, 7-12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. Specifically, the merchandise at issue meets all of the limitations of at least independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent. Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 35. “that are manufactured by, or on behalf of, or are imported by or on behalf of Techtronic Industries Co., Ltd.; Techtronic Industries North America, Inc.; One World Technologies, Inc.; OWT Industries, Inc.; or Et Technology (Wuxi) Co. or any of their affiliated companies, parents, subsidiaries, agents, or other related business entities, or their successors or assigns,” The merchandise at issue was imported by One World Technologies, Inc., a party subject to the 1016 LEO. See 1016 LEO; CBP Form 7501 Dated June 26, 2018 (listing One World Technologies Inc. as the importer of record).  “are excluded from entry for consumption into the United States, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, or withdrawal from a warehouse for consumption,” On the entry summary for the merchandise at issue, the entry type was identified as 01 (consumption entry). See CBP Form 7501 Dated June 26, 2018 (identifying the entry type as 01); see also https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated/ace-transaction-details. “for the remaining terms of the ’319 patent” The entry date and the import date for the merchandise at issue was June 12, 2018. See CBP Form 7501 Dated June 26, 2018. The ‘319 patent has not yet expired. “except under license of the patent owner or as provided by law.” Protestant has not argued or shown that the merchandise at issue should be allowed to enter the United States for consumption under either a license by the patent owner or by operation of law; accordingly, we find that the merchandise at issue is subject to the 1016 LEO. One World’s Arguments In the underlying investigation, the ITC determined that respondents TTi (which includes Protestant One World) infringed claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent through importation of the accused products, i.e., the ’319 Accused Products. ID at 128–42. Accordingly, the burden is on Protestant One World to establish that the merchandise at issue does not infringe any of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of the ’319 patent. See Hyundai Elecs. Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990). One World’s Memorandum in Support of Protest attempts to meet this burden by: (1) casting doubt on the infringement analysis performed by the IPR Branch, (2) arguing Chamberlain is estopped from arguing the ’319 patent claims cover the redesigned GDOs in view of arguments Chamberlain made at the ITC and before the U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and (3) arguing the claims must be interpreted more narrowly than they were at the ITC to preserve their validity. Memorandum in Support of Protest at 10-15. The IPR Branch Properly Concluded that the Redesigned GDOs Meet Every Limitation of Claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 Patent One World’s Memorandum in Support of Protest states “the IPRB concluded that all that is required to infringe the claims of the ’319 patent is the presence of some conductor—any conductor—somewhere between the microcontroller in the wall unit and the microcontroller in the head unit.” Memorandum in Support of Protest at 10. This statement mischaracterizes and oversimplifies the detailed infringement analysis performed by the IPR Branch. The IPR Branch’s ruling is based on its determination that the redesigned GDOs meet all of the limitations of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent by way of the long standing, well established two-step process of: (1) determining the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted, and then (2) comparing the properly construed claims to the allegedly infringing device. See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 24-28; see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). Only one claim limitation was at dispute with respect to infringement – claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent each recite “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus.” With respect to the first step of the two-step process – in the underlying investigation at the ITC, the Administrative Law Judge determined that the phrase “digital data bus” should have its plain and ordinary meaning which is ‘a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data.” Exh. B of Protest (ALJ’s Final Initial Determination, Doc ID 626478 (Oct. 2017)) at 123. Accordingly, the IPR Branch determined that this limitation of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent requires that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit be connected to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console by means of a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data. Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 25-26. Turning now to the second step, it is undisputed that the redesigned GDOs at issue before the IPR Branch for the ruling (and thus the merchandise at issue in the present protest) include: (a) a wireless, wall-mounted keypad, (b) a wireless receiver, and (c) a pair of wires that extends from the wireless receiver to the head unit. Id. at pp. 12-15, 25-27. During the oral argument before the IPR Branch, TTi conceded that the pair of wires connecting the head unit to the wireless receiver in the redesigned GDOs is a digital data bus that connects the wireless receiver to the controller in the head unit. See Exh. M of Protest (Oral Arg. Tr.) at 36:9–37:7, 38:6–10, 40:7–15. TTi also conceded that that the wireless receiver’s antenna in the redesigned GDOs, is, itself “a conductor that conveys digital signals.” See id. at 46:20–47:15. TTi further conceded that the microcontroller in the wall console (wireless, wall-mounted keypad) is connected to and conveys digital data to the wireless receiver via wireless communication of the wireless, wall-mounted keypad. See id. at 53:12–54:10. Again, when properly construed, the relevant limitation of claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent requires that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit be connected to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console by means of a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data (i.e. a “digital data bus”). By TTi’s own admissions, the combination of: (a) the pair of wires that extends from the wireless receiver to the head unit, (b) the wireless receiver, and (c) the wireless, wall-mounted keypad are a group of conductors that both covey digital data and connect the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console. Accordingly, the IPR Branch properly determined that the redesigned GDOs meet the only disputed limitation in claims 1 and 9 of the ‘319 patent, i.e., “said microcontroller [controller] of said motor drive unit being connected to the microcontroller [controller] of the wall console by means of a digital data bus.” Claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent do not include the type of limiting language that would allow the redesigned GDOs (which include the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers, i.e., the merchandise at issue) to escape literal infringement. For example, claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent do not recite that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit is connected to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console by means of a continuous, uninterrupted wire connection. Nor do claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent recite that the microcontroller (or controller) of the motor drive unit is connected to the microcontroller (or controller) of the wall console by means of an end to end wire connection. Indeed, claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent do not recite the terms “wire” or “line” at all. Instead, the claims recite that the connection between the microcontrollers (or controllers) is by means of a “digital data bus” – a broad term that the ALJ in the underlying investigation construed to mean “a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data.” One World did not argue before the IPR Branch during the inter partes proceeding, and does not argue now in this protest, that the pair or wires or the wireless receiver and transmitter in the redesigned GDOs are not conductors that covey digital data and/or do not connect the relevant microcontrollers (controllers). Quite the opposite – by TTi’s own admissions, the pair of wires connecting the head unit to the wireless receiver in the redesigned GDOs is a digital data bus (i.e., a conductor or group of conductors which conveys digital data) that connects the wireless receiver to the controller in the head unit, the wireless receiver’s antenna in the redesigned GDOs (and accordingly, the merchandise at issue) is “a conductor that conveys digital signals,” and the microcontroller in the wireless, wall-mounted keypad is connected to and conveys digital data to the wireless receiver via wireless communication of the wireless, wall-mounted keypad. As such, the redesigned GDOs (and the merchandise at issue) meet the claim limitation at issue, and One World has failed to meet its burden to show otherwise. One World’s Argument that Chamberlain is Estopped from Arguing that the ‘319 Patent Claims Cover the Merchandise at Issue Tellingly, One World advances several estoppel and disclaimer based arguments that the claims of the ’319 patent should not encompass the merchandise at issue, despite the plain language of the claims– as One World cannot escape literal infringement otherwise. These arguments would require CBP to apply a new, narrower claim construction than was applied at the ITC in the underlying investigation. During the inter partes proceeding before the IPR Branch, these arguments included prosecution history estoppel, disavowal of claim scope at the ITC and U.S. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, and interpreting the claims to preserve their validity based on the prior art and written description support. Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 28-35. The IPR Branch addressed each of these arguments in its ruling and was not persuaded by any of them. Id. Turning now to the estoppel based arguments raised in One World’s Memorandum in Support of Protest, One World argues that “Chamberlain repeatedly took the position – at the ITC and at the PTAB [i.e., the Patent Trial and Appeal Board] – that a wireless connection between the wall console and the head unit is not covered by the claims of the ‘319 patent [and is] estopped from taking a new position that is clearly inconsistent with the position it advocated previously.” Memorandum in Support of Protest at 11 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted). While Chamberlain acknowledged that “the path from the Redesigned GDOs’ head unit to the wall console is no longer wired end-to-end”, Chamberlain also noted that “the Redesigned GDOs maintain the wired keypad connection at the head unit.” Exh. O of Protest (Chamberlain Response) at 10 (emphasis added). As Chamberlain stated in their reply (Number 4 of Exhibit E of Protest) One World’s “argument fails because it adopts and relies on the false premise that the Redesigned GDOs have a ‘solely wireless’ wall console connection.” Chamberlain Reply at 7. As Chamberlain noted One World “[does] not (and cannot) identify any testimony from Chamberlain or Dr. Davis stating that the ’319 patent does not cover a part-wired/part-wireless connection.” Id. at 8 (emphasis in the original). Moreover, the portion of the record from the PTAB proceeding cited by One World in the Memorandum in Support of Protest does not rise to the level of a clear and unmistakable disclaimer required to limit the scope of the claims. A statement made in an inter partes review before the PTAB may limit claim scope if it amounts to a “clear and unmistakable” disclaimer. Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2017). One World argues that the following exchange from the deposition of Chamberlain’s expert, Dr. Nathaniel Davis is an example of Chamberlain’s expert confirming “that wireless communication was outside the scope of the claims”: Q. Have you ever seen [an outdoor garage keypad]? A. I have. Q. Is that connected by a wire, or connected by RF, typically? A. The ones I’m familiar with that you can buy and add onto your system are . . . connected by RF. Q. So those wouldn’t be a wall a console according to the ‘319 patent? A. I don’t think so. Memorandum in Support of Protest at 7 (citations omitted). Dr. Davis’s statements in this exchange do not amount to a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that wireless communications are outside the scope of the claims. Rather, this portion of the record from the PTAB proceeding cited by One World appears to generally discuss the connections of outdoor garage keypads and do not contain any disclaimers. Id. The only mention of the ‘319 patent within the exchange seems to be directed to the “wall console” limitation of the claims of the ‘319 patent. Id. However, there was no dispute that claim limitations A-E (which included a limitation for “a wall console”) was met by the Redesigned GDOs, which included the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers, i.e., the merchandise at issue. See Section I.C.3.a. Accordingly, we decline to adopt a more narrow interpretation of the claims than the plain and ordinary meaning adopted by the ITC. Finally, with respect to One World’s argument that Chamberlain’s position at the ITC also prevents them from arguing that the ‘319 patent claims cover the merchandise at issue, we note (as we did in CBP HQ Ruling H295697): To the extent Chamberlain argued that the claims required an end-to-end wired connection before the ITC, that fact does not advance TTi’s position because the ITC found otherwise after considering such arguments. Chamberlain Post-Proceeding Br. at 9; cf. ID at 122 (noting the Commission’s independent obligation to construe the claims) (citing Bancorp Servs, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, we decline to adopt a more narrow interpretation of the claims than the plain and ordinary meaning adopted by the ITC. See Exh. F of Protest (CBP HQ Ruling H295697) at 32. One World’s Argument that the Claims Must Be Interpreted More Narrowly Than They Were at the ITC to Preserve Their Validity With respect to interpreting the claims to preserve their validity, One World argues that “[i]n reality, the Redesigned GDOs use the same configuration described in the Doppelt prior art reference, such that the ‘319 patent claims cannot be both valid and infringed by the Redesigned GDOs” and that “Customs did not undertake an analysis of Doppelt as an anticipatory reference in assessing how its disclosure may impact Customs’ proposed claim construction.” Memorandum in Support of Protest at 12 and 13. While the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has frequently alluded to the “familiar axiom that claims should be so construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity”; at the same time it has “admonished against judicial rewriting of claims to preserve validity.” Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the axiom regarding the construction to preserve the validity of the claim does not apply unless after applying all the available tools of claim construction the claim is still ambiguous. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“That axiom is a qualified one, dependent upon the likelihood that a validity-preserving interpretation would be a permissible one.”); Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[C]laims can only be construed to preserve their validity where the proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is based on sound claim construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the explicit language of the claims.”); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“having concluded that the amended claim is susceptible of only one reasonable construction, we cannot construe the claim differently from its plain meaning in order to preserve its validity”). One World did not present arguments before the ITC that the claims themselves, or the phrase “digital data bus,” itself is ambiguous. Moreover, other than the arguments presented by TTi during the Part 177 Proceeding (which we have addressed at length in CBP HQ Ruling H295697 (Exh. F of Protest) at 32-34), no other arguments have been presented by One World arguing that there is ambiguity in the claims or the phrase “digital data bus.” Accordingly, we need not construe the claims with an eye to preserving their validity, but instead employ the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “digital data bus” adopted by the ITC. HOLDING: We find that One World has not met its burden to establish that the Ryobi GD126 garage door openers, the merchandise at issue, does not infringe the intellectual property at issue in the 1016 LEO (i.e., any of claims 1–4, 7–12, 15, and 16 of U.S. Patent No. 7,161,319). Specifically, the merchandise at issue appears to meet all of the limitations of at least independent claims 1 and 9 of the ’319 patent, and One World has not met its burden to establish that the merchandise at issue does not infringe these claims. We hold that the merchandise at issue is subject to the 1016 LEO. This protest challenging an exclusion from entry is DENIED. However, we note that any determination of the Commission, including those made subsequent to a proceeding commenced under 19 C.F.R. part 177 or a protest review decision, is binding authority and, in the case of conflict with a ruling issued under 19 C.F.R. part 177 or a protest review decision issued under 19 C.F.R. part 174, will by operation of law modify or revoke the ruling or protest review decision. In accordance with the Protest/Petition Processing Handbook (CIS HB, December 2007), you are to mail this decision to the Protestant. Sixty days from the date of the decision, Regulations and Rulings of the Office of Trade will make the decision available to CBP personnel, and to the public on the CBP website at www.cbp.gov, by means of the Freedom of Information Act, and other methods of public distribution. Sincerely, Charles R. Steuart Chief, Intellectual Property Rights Branch