Protest 2704-07-100664; U.S. International Trade Commission; General Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-514; Certain Plastic Food Containers

HQ H004452 September 25, 2009 OT:RR:BSTC:IPR H004452 DAX CATEGORY: 19 U.S.C. § 1337; Unfair Competition Port Director U.S. Customs and Border Protection 301 East Ocean Blvd. Suite 1400 Long Beach, CA 90802 RE: Protest 2704-07-100664; U.S. International Trade Commission; General Exclusion Order; Investigation No. 337-TA-514; Certain Plastic Food Containers Dear Port Director: This is in response to the application for further review of the above-referenced protest filed by Next Wave Packaging, Inc. (“Protestant”) challenging the exclusion from entry for consumption of certain plastic food containers determined by the port to fall within the scope of the above-referenced general exclusion order issued by the U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”). FACTS: On February 28, 2007, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) issued a notice to Protestant indicating that a shipment of plastic food containers was deemed excluded from entry for consumption because the plastic food containers in question were covered by the general exclusion order issued by the ITC in Inv. No. 337-TA-514 (“514 GEO”). See Protest at 1. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c), as implemented by 19 C.F.R § 174, on March 8, 2007, Protestant timely filed a valid protest challenging the exclusion from entry and determination that the plastic food containers at issue fell within the scope of the 514 GEO. Specifically, Protestant denies that the plastic food containers infringe any of the patents at issue during the investigation at, and found to be infringed by, the ITC. As Protestant states, ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-514 was instituted based on a complaint filed by Newspring Industrial Corp. (“Complainant”), which named two parties as Respondents to the investigation. See Protest at 2-3. The ITC instituted the investigation to determine whether there was a violation of subsection (a)(1)(B) of section 337 in the importation into the United States, the sale for importation into the United States, or the sale within the United States after importation of certain plastic food containers by reason of infringement of one or more of claims 1-5 of utility U.S. Patent No. 6,056,138 (“the ‘138 patent”), claims 1-2 and 4-9 of utility U.S. Patent No. 6,196,404 (“the ‘404 patent”), and the claim of design U.S. Patent No. D 415,420 (“the ‘420 patent”). See Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) Initial Determination at 3 (February 10, 2005). Protestant was not named as a Respondent in the investigation. The ALJ found a violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and issued an initial determination granting Complainant’s motion for a summary determination with respect to most, but not all, issues presented, which was affirmed by the Commission after limited review to examine possible formatting and typographical errors. See Commission Opinion at 1-3 (May 23, 2005). Accordingly, the ITC provided relief in the form of a general exclusion order that bars the entry for consumption into the United States of plastic food containers covered by one or more of claim 1 of the ‘138 patent, claim 1 of the ‘404 patent, or the claimed design of the ‘420 patent. See 514 General Exclusion Order (May 23, 2005). As stated above, Protestant was not named as a Respondent to the investigation, nor were the excluded plastic food containers at issue in this protest analyzed during the investigation at the ITC. The excluded plastic food containers are depicted in the images below. Notably, the excluded plastic food containers consist of two pieces (a top or “lid” and a bottom or “base”) and exhibit two different embodiments or styles. The first style consists of a generally rectangular shape, while the second style is circular in design. A representative rectangular-shaped plastic food container has been cut in half (as shown below in the image on the right) to reveal the existence of the various seals described later in this determination.
 ISSUE: The issue presented is whether the excluded plastic food containers infringe any of the relevant patents at issue and therefore fall within the scope of the 514 GEO. LAW AND ANALYSIS: The ITC has authority to conduct investigations into imported articles that allegedly infringe United States patents and impose remedies if the accused products are found to be infringing. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B), (b)(1), (d), (f). Specifically, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) provides the Commission authority to direct the exclusion from entry of articles found to be infringing. Moreover, when the Commission determines that there has been a violation of section 337, as amended, it may issue two types of exclusion orders: a limited exclusion order and/or a general exclusion order. See Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Certain Ink Cartridges and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-565, Commission Opinion (October 19, 2007). Both types of orders direct CBP to bar infringing products from entering the country. See Yingbin-Nature (Guangdong) Wood Indus. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 535 F.3d 1322, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). A limited exclusion order is “limited” in that it only applies to the specific parties before the Commission in the investigation. Id. In contrast, a general exclusion order bars the importation of infringing products by everyone, regardless of whether they were Respondents in the Commission’s investigation. Id. A general exclusion order is only appropriate if two exceptional circumstances apply. See Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1340, 1356. A general exclusion order may only be issued if (1) “necessary to prevent circumvention of a limited exclusion order,” or (2) “there is a pattern of violation of this section and it is difficult to identify the source of infringing products.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2); see Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1356 (“If a complainant wishes to obtain an exclusion order operative against articles of non-respondents, it must seek a GEO by satisfying the heightened burdens of §§ 1337(d)(2)(A) and (B).”). As stated above, the 514 GEO issued by the ITC provides, in relevant part, that: Plastic food containers covered by one or more of claim 1 of the ‘420 patent, claim 1 of the ‘138 patent, or claim 1 of the ‘404 patent, or [sic] are excluded from entry for consumption, entry for consumption from a foreign-trade zone, and withdrawal from warehouse for consumption for the remaining term of the patents, except under license of the patent owner or as provided by law. The ITC’s order is typical of general exclusion orders, speaking in terms of patent claims rather than parties and/or infringing products. See Yingbin-Nature, 535 F.3d at 1331. The 514 GEO directs CBP to exclude plastic food containers, regardless of their manufacturer or importer, that infringe the patents included above. Accordingly, since the ITC issued a general exclusion order based on the additional findings required by 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(2), the fact that Protestant was not named as a Respondent before the ITC is immaterial to the question of whether the accused plastic food containers fall within the scope of the 514 GEO. The only pertinent question is whether the plastic food containers infringe any of the relevant patents. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.“); see also Vastfame Camera, Ltd. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1108, 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“A general exclusion order broadly prohibits entry of articles that infringe the relevant claims of a listed patent without regard to whether the persons importing such articles were parties to, or were related to parties to, the investigation that led to issuance of the general exclusion order.”). Significantly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) has recognized that issuance of a general exclusion order by the ITC binds named parties and non-named parties alike and shifts to would-be importers (such as Protestant), “as a condition of entry, the burden of establishing noninfringement.” Hyundai Electronics Industries Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204, 1210 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the burden is on Protestant to establish that the excluded plastic food containers at issue do not infringe any of the relevant patents. UTILITY PATENT INFRINGEMENT Patent infringement determinations for utility patents entail two steps. The first step is to interpret the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. The second step is to compare the properly construed claims to the accused device. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). The first step is a question of law; the second step is a question of fact. See Freedman Seating Co. v. American Seating Company, 420 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In patent law, there are two types of infringement: direct and indirect infringement. Direct infringement includes two varieties: literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement is when every limitation recited in a claim is found in the accused device. See Strattec Security Corp. v. General Automotive Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411, 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Circ. 1998) (“An accused device cannot infringe, as a matter of law, if even a single limitation is not satisfied.”). Under the doctrine of equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950)). The CAFC applies two articulations of the test for equivalence. See Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that different phrasing may be “more suitable to different cases, depending on their particular facts…”). Under the insubstantial differences test, “[a]n element in the accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation if the only differences between the two are insubstantial.” Id. at 1326 (citing Honeywell International Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Alternatively, under the function-way-result test, an element in the accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation if it “performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain substantially the same result.” Id. (citing Schoell v. Regal Marine Industries, Inc., 247 F.3d 1202, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel acts as a constraint to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-41 (“Prosecution history estoppel requires that the claims of a patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the PTO during the application process….The doctrine of equivalents allows the patentee to claim those insubstantial alterations that were not captured in drafting the original patent claim but which could be created through trivial changes. When, however, the patentee originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the literal claims of the issued patent. On the contrary, by the amendment [the patentee] recognized and emphasized the difference between the two phrases[,]…and the difference which [the patentee] thus disclaimed must be regarded as material.…Prosecution history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”) (internal citations omitted). As for the scope of protection provided by the utility patents at issue in the 514 GEO, it is a “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e look to the words of the claims themselves…to define the scope of the patented invention.”). Furthermore, the CAFC has made clear that claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning, which refers specifically to the ordinary and customary meaning that the claim term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). The inquiry into how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term provides an objective baseline from which to begin claim interpretation. See Innova, 381 F.3d at 1116. That starting point is based on the well-settled understanding that inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention and that patents are addressed to and intended to be read by others of skill in the pertinent art. See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc., 311 F.3d 1116, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Often, this requires an examination of terms that have a particular meaning in a field of art. Id. Since the meaning of a claim term, as understood by persons of skill in the art, is often not immediately apparent, and since patentees frequently act as their own lexicographers, a court or administrative body responsible for making patent infringement determinations should look to sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would have understood a disputed claim term to mean. Id. These sources include, for example, the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification and the prosecution history, along with certain extrinsic evidence in appropriate circumstances. Id. Importantly, as stated by the CAFC in Vitronics and reaffirmed in Phillips, claims must be read in light of the specification, of which they are a part, since the specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Philips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582); see also Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The specification is, thus, the primary basis for construing the claims.”). DESIGN PATENT INFRINGEMENT The starting point for any proper examination of design patent law, as made clear by the CAFC, is the Supreme Court’s decision in Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871). See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, 543 F.3d 665, 670 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). The Gorham Court, in reviewing the infringement allegation before it, stated that the test of identity of design “must be sameness of appearance, and mere difference of lines in the drawing or sketch…or slight variances in configuration…will not destroy the substantial identity.” Gorham, 81 U.S. at 526-27. The Supreme Court then established the test for infringement that would be used in future design patent cases: “[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first patented is infringed by the other.” Id. at 528. The Supreme Court concluded, while addressing the merits of the specific case before it, that “whatever differences there may be between the plaintiff’s design and those of the defendant in details of ornament, they are still the same in general appearance and effect, so much alike that in the market and with purchasers they would pass for the same thing—so much alike that even persons in the trade would be in danger of being deceived.” Id. at 531. Since that time, the test provided by the Supreme Court has generally been referred to as the “ordinary observer” test and has been recognized by lower courts, including the CAFC and its predecessors, as the proper standard for making determinations involving design patent infringement. See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670. Moreover, the CAFC recently reaffirmed the continuing vitality of this approach to design patent determinations by rehearing Egyptian Goddess en banc and producing an opinion addressing the proper legal standard to be used in such cases. In the unanimous opinion before the en banc court, the CAFC provided an overview of design patent decisions that followed the standard articulated in Gorham and commented that these intervening cases are properly read as applying a version of the ordinary observer test in which the ordinary observer is deemed to view the differences between the patented design and the accused product in the context of the prior art. Id. at 676. Additionally, Egyptian Goddess repudiated the “point of novelty” test as the appropriate standard for design patent infringement determinations. This test, which required a trial court to examine the prior art and the claimed design to identify one or more points of novelty that distinguish the claimed design from the prior art, and thereby determine whether these points of novelty were included in the accused design, occasionally resulted in a contentious analysis. See Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009).    For example, one problem with the analysis under the “point of novelty” test was that it “proved difficult to apply in cases in which there are several different features that can be argued to be points of novelty in the claimed design. In such cases, the outcome of the case can turn on which of the several candidate points of novelty the court or fact-finder focuses on. The attention of the court may therefore be focused on whether the accused design has appropriated a single specified feature of the claimed design, rather than on the proper inquiry, i.e., whether the accused design has appropriated the claimed design as a whole.” Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 677 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the “point of novelty” test was found to be problematic since “the more novel the design, and the more points of novelty that are identified, the more opportunities there are for a defendant to argue that its design does not infringe because it does not copy all of the points of novelty, even though it may copy most of them and even though it may give the overall appearance of being identical to the claimed design. In such cases, a test that asks how an ordinary observer with knowledge of the prior art designs would view the differences between the claimed and accused designs is likely to produce results more in line with the purposes of design patent protection.” Id. Accordingly, Egyptian Goddess held “that the ‘point of novelty’ test should no longer be used in the analysis of a claim of design patent infringement….Instead, in accordance with Gorham and subsequent decisions, we hold that the ‘ordinary observer’ test should be the sole test for determining whether a design patent has been infringed. Un